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The aim of this paper is to reconsider Plotinus’ account of transmigration in the light of his 
dual-aspect theory of the soul. It is argued that transmigration is discussed in the Enneads 
only in relation to the lower perceptible part of the soul. The higher intelligible part of the 
soul remains undescended and uninvolved in any kind of transmigration. Plotinus’ treatment 
of transmigration also aims at emphasizing the soul’s higher life of virtue. The noble soul 
concentrates on its higher intelligible part in constant contemplation of the Forms without 
being affected by its lower perceptible part and therefore transmigration. 
 
The notion of transmigration is a controversial issue in the Enneads2 and an 
issue of dispute for later Neoplatonists 3 . Modern scholars have taken different 
approaches: whereas Inge 4 , Pistorius 5  and Smith 6  minimize the importance of 
transmigration in the Enneads, Rich7, Rist8, Blumenthal9 and Armstrong10 maintain 
                                                        
1
 I am thankful to Andrew Smith, Rosemary Wright, Leo Catana and the members of the Center for 
Neoplatonic Virtue Ethics at the University of Copenhagen for their invaluable comments and 
suggestions. 
2
 See Enneads i 1.11-12; ii 9.6.10-28; iii 4.2; iv 3.9; iv 7.14.1-8. 
3
 For the problem of transmigration in Platonism and Neoplatonism see Dörrie 1957, Smith 1984 and 
1987; see also Wallis 1995, 113. For a recent account on Platonism and transmigration see Leftow 
2011, 25 ff. 
4
 Inge 1929, 33-34 suggests that Plotinus’ doctrine of transmigration should not be taken seriously and 
literally in scientific terms.  
5
 Pistorius 1952, 98 maintains that transmigration is an ancient doctrine that Plotinus just uses in his 
work without further significance. 
6
 Smith 1984 states that the doctrine of transmigration does not seem to have greatly worried Plotinus. 
Smith appropriately argues that transmigration appears to be a serious issue for consideration in 
Porphyry, while Proclus seems to be the first Neoplatonist to find a solution in a compromise way.    
7
 Rich 1957 provides the first complete analysis of the problem of transmigration by refuting Inge 1929 
and Pistorius 1952 on the insignificance of transmigration in the Enneads. He argues that Plotinus’ 
believed in transmigration literally and not merely as a metaphor or myth. 
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the view that Plotinus assigned serious significance to it. In this paper, it is suggested 
that Plotinus’ account of transmigration should be reconsidered in the light of his dual 
theory of the soul11. After some preliminary remarks on the terminology and the 
philosophical sources of transmigration in the Enneads (Section 1), it is argued that 
since the higher intelligible part of the soul remains impassive and aloft, 
transmigration involves only the lower perceptible part of the soul that is related to 
the compound living bodies (Section 2). It is implied that Plotinus’ theory of 
transmigration aims also to highlight the virtuous life of the wise soul. The noble soul 
focuses on its higher intelligible self in constant contemplation of the Forms without 
being affected by its lower perceptible self and therefore any kind of transmigration 
(Section 3). 
 
1 
 
The term metemyÚcwsij does not appear in the Enneads. Plotinus uses the 
term metenswm£twsij for the transmigration of the soul in passages i 1.12.24; ii 
9.6.13 and iv 3.9.5-6. Later Neoplatonists used both metemyÚcwsij and 
metenswm£twsij for their relevant accounts of transmigration, particularly in relation 
to the soul’s destiny after death and the question of transmigration of human souls 
                                                                                                                                                              
8
 Rist 1963, 227.  
9
 Blumenthal 1966, 79.   
10
 Armstrong 1967, 146-147 notes (on Ennead iii 4) that Plotinus follows Plato’s doctrine of 
transmigration in Phaedo (81e-82b), Republic X and Timaeus 91-92 and “there is no doubt that he took 
Plato’s statement about animal reincarnation literally and seriously”.  
11
 As ‘dual theory of the soul’ I refer to Plotinus’ two-part theory of the soul (= higher intelligible part 
related to Intellect and the lower perceptible part related to the bodies). For the dual theory of the soul 
and its relation to dual selfhood in the Enneads see Stern-Gillet 2010; see also Remes 2007, 23-59. It 
has to be noted that in this paper Plotinus’ dual soul is not considered in terms of mind-body Cartesian 
type dualism but in terms of dual-aspect monism which conceives the soul as a unified and 
homogenous being consisted of two interrelated aspects (= higher and lower). For the dual aspect 
theory and its relation to monistic metaphysics see Stubenberg 2010. For a general survey of dualistic 
and monistic interpretations of the soul in Plotinus see Helleman-Elgersma 1980, 89 ff.  
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into animals.12 Whereas metemyÚcwsij emphasizes transition at the level of the soul 
(i.e. the soul incarnates into a new body), the term metenswm£twsij emphasizes 
transition at the level of the body (i.e. the soul moves and animates different bodies). 
The question of transmigration is traced back to Plato13 and some pre-Platonic 
accounts of the soul, particularly from the early Pythagoreans and Empedocles. 14 As 
Plotinus himself states (vi 4.16.4) in a discussion of the soul’s “entries into the bodies 
of other animals” (εἰς ἄλλων ζῴων σώµατα εἰσκρίσεις): “we have received these 
views from those who in ancient times have philosophized best about the soul; and it 
is proper to try to show that our present discourse is in agreement, or at least not in 
disagreement, with them” (vi 4.16.4-7). According to Armstrong, this is “a very firm 
statement of the traditionalism of Plotinus; the ancient philosophers are of course 
Plato and, secondarily, the Pythagoreans”. 15  However, Plotinus’ expression piάλαι 
piερὶ ψυχῆς ἄριστα piεφιλοσοφηκότων in vi 4.16.5 is not explicit, and references to 
other ancient philosophers should not be excluded.  
The case of Ennead iii 4.2.16-30 is relevant for possible Platonic and pre-
Platonic evidences concerning transmigration in Plotinus: 
Those, then, who guarded the man in them, become men again. Those who lived by sense 
alone become animals; but if their sense-perceptions have been accompanied by passionate 
temper they become wild animals, and the difference in temper in them makes the differences 
between the animals of this kind; those whose sense-perceptions went with desires of the 
flesh and the delight of the desiring part of the soul become lustful and gluttonous animals. 
But if they did not even live by sense along with their desires but coupled them with dullness 
of perception, they even turn into plants; for it was this, the growth-principle which worked in 
                                                        
12
 The term metenswm£twsij is used twice by Proclus In Platonis rem publicam commentarii ii 322.28 
and In Platonis Timaeum commentaria i 113.3. The term metemyÚcwsij is used by Porphyry (De 
abstinentia iv 16.15), Iamblichus (Theologoumena arithmeticae 52.12), Proclus (In Platonis rem 
publicam commentarii ii 340.23) and Damascius (In Phaedonem 335.1); see Smith 1984. 
13
 The term metemyÚcwsij is not found in Plato’s works. Olympiodorus, In Platonis Phaedonem 
commentaria 9.6 offers a comparison between the terms metenswm£twsij and metemyÚcwsij on the 
soul and the animation of the bodies with reference to Plato’s Phaedo 87b2–88b8. See Westernik 2009, 
134.  
14
 See Armstrong 1967, vol. III, 146-147, n. 1 and Kalligas 2004, 390.  
15
 Armstrong 1988, 321 (on Ennead vi 4.16); for Plotinus and the Pythagorean doctrine of 
transmigration see also Luchte 2009. Luchte in chapter 9 discusses the doctrine of transmigration in 
relation to the noetic ascent of the soul towards the One.  
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them, alone or predominantly, and they were taking care to turn themselves into trees. Those 
who loved music but were in other ways respectable turn into song-birds; kings who ruled 
stupidly into eagles, if they had no other vices; astronomers who were always raising 
themselves to the sky without philosophic reflection turn into birds which fly high. The man 
who practiced community virtue becomes a man again; but one who has a lesser share of it a 
creature that lives in community, a bee or something of the sort. [iii 4.2.16-30; trans. 
Armstrong] 
This passage is regarded as an indirect allusion to Plato’s account of 
transmigration found in the Phaedo (81e-82b), the Republic (620) and the Timaeus 
(91d-92c).16 As Rich observes, Plotinus adopts the same playful tone and vocabulary 
used by Plato in the Phaedo for the transmigration of the soul into animal bodies.17 
However, Plotinus seems to accept the transmigration of some form of soul not only 
to humans and animals but also to insects and plants. This version of transmigration is 
found in Empedocles 18  and it has been suggested that iii 4.2.16-30 alludes to 
Empedocles’ DK fragments B117 and B127.19 In addition, Empedocles’ fragment 
B115 on the destiny of δαίµων20 is relevant to Plotinus’ account of transmigration in 
iii 4.2.16-30, and particularly his treatment of the soul as δαίµων in iii 4.3. 
Empedocles’ fragment B117 is frequently quoted in subsequent philosophical 
discussions on the possibility of the human soul’s transmigration into other forms of 
life21 , as well as in the context of the problem of justice and impiety found in 
fragment B13722. Empedocles’ view of transmigration is also related to the early 
                                                        
16
 See Kalligas 2004, 390, and his comment on iii 4.2.16-30.  
17
 See Rich 1957, 232, n. 3.  
18
 Empedocles considers his own life-history as one of transmigration into various forms, including 
animals and plants. See the introduction of Inwood 2001, 55-68. 
19
 See Armstrong 1967, 146-147, n. 1 on Ennead iii 4.2 and Kalligas ibid.  
20
 Empedocles describes the soul as a divine spirit (δαίµων) which descends into the material world, 
passing through a number of lives in different elements as different kinds of mortal beings by following 
the divine law of necessity. See Wright 1981, 69-76; and also Inwood 2001, 86-90. 
21
 Hippolytus Refutatio 1.3 (A31) uses the term metenswm£twsij, the same word used by Plotinus, 
just before quoting Empedocles’ fragment B117. Aelian On Animals 12.7 (B127) refers to Empedocles 
and the transmigration of humans to animals. See Wright 1981, 275-276 and 290-291; Roussos 2007, 
244; Inwood 2001, 151. 
22
 Sextus, in Adversus Mathematicos 9.126-130, relates metenswm£twsij to Empedocles and the 
Pythagoreans = fragment B137. See Wright 1981, 286-287 and Inwood 2001, 147-148. 
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Pythagoreans, and Porphyry testifies (Vita Pythagorae 19) that Pythagoras was the 
first philosopher to introduce the doctrine of transmigration into Greece.23 The initial 
Pythagorean notion of transmigration is based on the conflict between body and soul, 
and it is further related to Orphic doctrines according to which the body is viewed as 
the ‘tomb’ or ‘prison’ of the soul (Plato Cratylus 400c). For the early Pythagoreans, it 
is according to one’s present deeds that the soul changes into different life forms, and 
only the ‘noble’ souls are released from the suffering of transmigration. 24 Likewise, 
Empedocles stresses the ‘decree’ of the soul being born in different elements as 
different kinds of lives (B115). Empedocles considers the descent of the δαίµων as a 
decline, and the embodied soul as “clothed in an unfamiliar garment of flesh” (B126): 
mortals are “poor, unhappy creatures”, born from strife and lamentation (B124). The 
life in the body is Øp' ¥ntron ØpÒstegon (B120), and it is significant that the source 
of this particular fragment is Plotinus’ disciple Porphyry (De Antro Nympharum 8.14), 
who also relates Empedocles to the Pythagoreans.25  
In Ennead iv 8 On the Descent of the Soul into the Bodies Plotinus is aware of 
Empedocles’ ¥ntron in relation to Plato’s sp»laion, but would find the concept of a 
fallen soul that descends into the body unacceptable. In iv 8.1.17-23, Plotinus refers to 
Empedocles and the ‘riddling’ accounts of the Pythagoreans, but he also distances 
Plato, Heraclitus and Empedocles (iv.8.5)26 from the general spirit of conflict in the 
Pythagorean body-soul dualism and eschatology.27 Plotinus’ reply to the Pythagorean 
body-soul dualism is based on the ontological unity of his own dual theory of the soul, 
and the homogeneity between the higher intelligible part of the soul and the lower 
perceptible part of the soul related to the living bodies. Plotinus’ dual theory of the 
                                                        
23
 See Stamatellos 2012, 55-57. 
24
 For the doctrine of transmigration in Pythagoras and the early Pythagoreans see Luchte 2009.    
25
 See Roussos 2007, 240-241. 
26
 Plotinus’ interpretation of Empedocles (particularly B115) is different from that of Simplicius, In 
Physica IX.159.9. Plotinus interprets Empedocles not as a Pythagorean dualist but as a pre-Platonist 
who supports the unity, intelligibility and morality of the soul in the image of δαίµων. 
27
 See Stamatellos 2007, 166-171.  
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soul explains his use of transmigration in the Enneads and it is discussed in the next 
section.  
 
2  
 
In Ennead iv 8 Plotinus denies the descend of the soul into the bodies.28 He 
considers, or even reconsiders, the descent of the soul not as a fall but as a kind of 
spiritual mission necessary for self-realisation, and its return to the divine as gained 
through self-knowledge and contemplation. The soul as a whole is described in terms 
of ontological unity and homogeneity29: as a single intelligible source that animates 
any human, animal or plant form.30 The soul is conceived as amphibian, living a 
‘double life’ (iv 8.4.19) between the intelligible and the perceptible world (iv 8.8).31 
The psyche has a ‘double nature’, partly intelligible and partly perceptible (iv 8.7); 
and so it is able to recognize and participate in both the world of the eternal Forms 
and the world of temporal becoming. Plotinus divides (theoretically but not 
ontologically) the hypostasis of soul into world soul and individual souls (iv 8.2). 
Whereas the individual soul governs with difficulty and struggle the lower in purity 
and unity perceptible body, the world soul cares and directs the higher universal body 
with pure intelligible power. The world soul animates the corporeal bodies with its 
logoi (iii 6.19.26-29; iv 3.10.35-42; v 1.6) and illuminates with its intelligible light the 
perceptible universe (iii 8.4).  
Thus, for Plotinus, every soul has something of what is ‘below’ in the 
direction of the body (= the lower perceptible part) and of what is ‘above’ (= the 
                                                        
28
 See Kalligas 2009, 614-618. 
29
 Plotinus’ theory of soul is present throughout the nine treatises of Ennead IV; for a general account 
on the Plotinian soul see the influential study of Blumenthal 1971.  
30
 See Blumenthal 1971, 14 f., 29, 73-74.  
31
 For soul as principle of mediation between the intelligible and the perceptible world see Rangos 
1999. 
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higher intelligible part) in the contemplation of Intellect (iv 8.8.11-13). 32  In this 
context Plotinus’ psychology is marked by his dual selfhood theory.33 He maintains 
two kinds of selves: (a) the higher self related to the higher part of the soul and the 
intelligible world and (b) the composite soul-body selves related to the lower part of 
the soul and perceptible world. 34  However, the distinction between the higher 
intelligible self and the lower perceptible self in Plotinus should not be conceived in 
terms of a mind-body Cartesian type dualism; i.e. the soul’s higher self (=related to 
mind) and the lower self (= related to the body) are not two distinct ontological states 
or parts. Plotinus’ dual theory of the soul should be approached in terms of a dual-
aspect monism35, which supports the ontological unity and homogeneity of the one 
psychē. The higher and lower parts of the soul are two aspects of the same and 
homogenous soul. In the light of Plotinus’ ontological priority of the soul and his dual 
aspect monistic psychology, the soul is defined as not present in the body but the 
body as present in the soul (iv 3.22-23)36; it is the body that is ensouled and not the 
soul that is embodied. 37  Hence Plotinus considers the perceptible bodies as 
illuminations (ἐλλάµψεις) of the intelligible entities upon matter (vi 7.7.12). The 
perceptible bodies are composite entities of matter and form (ii 4.2.15), but they are 
still mere representations - “images drawn on the shadow” (vi 3.8.35-36, III 6.14.25). 
The higher part of the soul is not affected by the lower part attached in the bodies (iv 
3.12; iii 6.7-13; v 1.9.20-34).  
Plotinus’ treatment of transmigration as metenswm£twsij should be 
reconsidered in this context of his dual theory of the soul. As Dillon suggests, 
Plotinus’ view of transmigration makes it possible to envisage “a form of the sum-
                                                        
32
 See Blumenthal 1971, 65 ff. See also Remes 2007, 23 ff. 
33
 For dual selfhood in Plotinus see Stern-Gillet 2010, 331-337. 
34
 See Remes 2007, 23-59.  
35
 For the dual aspect theory see Stubenberg 2010, 9.4.  
36
 Plotinus seems to follow Plato’s Timaeus 34d and 36d; see Kalligas 2009, 407-408. 
37
 For this body and soul relation in Plotinus see Clark 1996.  
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total of individual manifestations of the same soul”.38 Following this view, Plotinus’ 
account of µετασχηµ£τισις as change of form, costume and posture, found in Enneads 
iii 2.15.46 and iv 4.33.29, is relevant to metenswm£twsij, and it is used to illustrate 
the soul-body relationship. This is justified both at the cosmic and the human level. 
At the cosmic level, µετασχηµ£τισις refers to the continual change and 
movement of the celestial bodies within the harmonious cycles of the universe (iv 
4.33). Plotinus finds a symbol for the heavenly circuit of the cosmos in the 
pantomime dance of the divine dancer acting in a rich variety of solo dance-
movements. The whole universe “actively lives its own complete life, moving its 
great parts within itself, and continually rearranging them” (µετασχηµατίζονται ἀεί)” 
as in the dance of pantomime (25-30).39  The celestial arrangements manifest the 
divine logos: i.e. the movements of the heavenly circuit are transformations caused by 
the movements of the divine dancer.40  
At the human level, Plotinus maintains that tragic and cruel moments in life 
should not be taken seriously, but they should be regarded as incidents in the plot of a 
play: “we should be spectators of murders, and deaths, and takings and sacking of 
cities, as if they were on the stages of theaters, all changes of scenery and costume 
(µετασχηµατίσεις) and acted wailings and weepings” (iii 2.15.43-47). It is not our 
inner-man (= our higher self) that participates in the ‘game of life’ but the outer-man 
(=our lower self), that is, “the outside shadow of man” (47-50). The inner-man 
remains unaffected by bodily affections and sufferings while the outer-man “has to 
put off the play-costume in which he is dressed” (55-57). The bodily life of the outer-
                                                        
38
 See Dillon 1992, 198. 
39
 See also Ennead iii 2.16; Armstrong 1967, 240 notes that Plotinus’ metaphor of the pantomime 
symbolizes the living and moving harmony of the cosmos corresponding to the Indian divine figure of 
the dancing Shiva; see also Kalligas 2004, 485-486 on iv 4.33.  
40
 Plato at Laws X (903e5) uses µετασχηµ£τισις with reference to cosmos and god: it is related to the 
god’s effortless supervision of the cosmos by ‘transforming everything’ (µετασχηµατίζων τὰ piάντα) in 
the universe, instead of producing varieties from unity. Probably, Plotinus treatment of µετασχηµ£τισις 
in iv 4 alludes to Plato’s Laws.  
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man is like a role in earthly life, and the changes of forms and costumes in the drama 
of life are bodily µετασχηµατίσεις of the soul.41  
It is noteworthy that the changing-role metaphor was also used by later 
Neoplatonists such as Iamblichus who claimed that, in transmigration, the human 
substance remains the same as the actor’s human nature, despite the external changes 
in different roles.42 However, the transmigration of the human soul into animal bodies 
was a controversial issue for later Neoplatonists. On the one hand, Iamblichus and 
Proclus rejected human transmigration to animals since human and animal souls are 
essentially different or, as Wallis has stated, “they denied that animals have souls at 
all in the strict sense of the term”.43 When the evil man acquires a beast-like character 
then the sinful human soul is temporarily associated with an animal body or form.44 
On the other hand, Porphyry seems to follow Plotinus’ transmigration of the human 
soul into animal bodies in so far as both human souls and animal souls are derived 
from the same intelligible source.45  
Plotinus’ treatment of transmigration diminishes the ontological differences 
between psychic classes and hierarchies.46  Whereas for Plotinus transmigration is 
based on the non-hierarchical unity and homogeneity of the soul, later Neoplatonists 
refuted transmigration through greater emphasis on a hierarchical ontology, in which 
the existence of the human soul possesses a higher rank than that of other animals. 
Since, for Plotinus, the soul is a homogenous and single intelligible source of life, all 
                                                        
41
 The term µετασχηµατιζοµένας is also used by Plutarch (De sera numinis vindicta 567e) for the 
reshaping of the souls to suit the body (ψυχὰς εἴς τε ζῷα piαντοδαpiὰ καµpiτοµένας βίᾳ καὶ 
µετασχηµατιζοµένας); see the analysis of Smith 1984, 277. 
42
 Smith ibid. 280-281. 
43
 See Wallis 1995, 120. Wallis 1995, 113 observes that Augustine and Aeneas of Gaza rejected animal 
transmigration in the light of Iamblichus’ doctrine of transmigration. 
44
 The Chaldaean Oracles rejected animal transmigration, Proclus In Remp. ii 336.27 ff. 
45
 As Smith 1984 observes, while Augustine states explicitly that Porphyry denied transmigration, 
Porphyry texts show that he used transmigration both in literal and metaphorical terms. For an 
evaluation of eschatology in Porphyry and Plotinus see Smith 1974, 69 ff. 
46
 See Wallis 1995, 113 and 120.  
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transmigrations into various life forms are possible, and so all ensouled bodies are 
rational and immortal: 
As for the souls of other living things, those of them which have been failures and come into 
animal bodies must also be immortal. But if there is another [non-human] kind of soul, it 
cannot come from anywhere else than from the nature which lives, and this too must really 
exist and be the cause of life in the living things, and the same is certainly true of the soul in 
plants: for they all started from the same origin and have their own life and they too are 
bodiless and without parts and substances. [iv 7.14.1-8; trans. Armstrong] 
However, the making of the lower animals is not against the nature of the soul 
(vi 7.7). If the soul has the opportunity, it makes what is finer - like a craftsman who 
knows how to make various forms but selects a particular one in accordance with the 
requirements of the specific material (1-8).  
For what is there to prevent the power of the Soul of the All from drawing a preliminary 
outline, since it is the universal forming principle (logos), even before the soul-powers come 
from it, and this preliminary outline being like illuminations running on before matter, and the 
soul which carries out the work following traces of this kind and making by articulating the 
traces part by part, and each individual soul becoming this to which it came by figuring itself, 
as the dancer does to the dramatic part given him? [vi 7.7.8-15; trans. Armstrong]  
Plotinus’ image of the dancer performing a dramatic part in this passage (τὸν 
ἐν ὀρχήσει piρὸς τὸ δοθὲν αὐτῷ δρᾶµα) refers back to iii 2.15 and iv 4.33 on the 
µετασχηµατίσεις of the soul.  
Thus Plotinus’ notion of transmigration as metenswm£twsij should be 
understood as involving the lower perceptible part of the soul. Transmigration should 
be considered as an illumination (ἔλλαµψις) of the world soul directed to what is 
below (i 1.12.24-25: ἡ νεῦσις ἔλλαµψις piρὸς τὸ κάτω). Whereas the higher part of the 
soul, which is identified with the world soul, constantly contemplates the intelligible 
world, the lower part of the soul, unceasingly animates the perceptible bodies. 
Therefore, since all perceptible bodies are illuminations of the world soul, 
transmigration is related to the lower perceptible part for soul. Transmigration should 
be conceived as a transient ἔλλαµψις of the world soul’s higher intelligible light 
transmitted into different bodily forms, but without affecting the unity and 
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homogeneity of the soul as an organic whole. Plotinus’ ontology of transmigration has 
also some ethical objectives that are discussed in the next section. 
 
3 
 
In Ennead iv 3.9.14-16, Plotinus considers the body’s ensoulment not for literal 
but for didactic purposes. He states that with regard to the world soul the terms “entry” 
(εἴσοδος) and “ensoulment” (ἐµψύχωσις) are used for explanatory reasons 
(διδασκαλίας καὶ τοῦ σαφοῦς χάριν).47 Plotinus’ consideration appears just a few lines 
after his discussion on metenswm£twsij and his aporia about the soul’s entering into 
the body. The didactics of transmigration may be also observed in Ennead in iii 
4.2.28-30. Plotinus relates transmigration to political virtue (piολιτικὴ ἀρετ»)48 and 
distinguishes between different degrees of involvement in the community: active 
involvement (man) and lesser involvement (animal or insect). He maintains that the 
man who is actively involved in the community and practices political virtue becomes 
a man again, while the one who lives a life with a lesser share in community becomes 
an animal or insect of lower sort. Whereas the wicked soul weights down by the force 
of its bad spirit, the wise soul ascends to the higher intelligible world through the 
power of virtue.  
For Plotinus, virtue purifies and raises the soul from the perceptible world of 
temporal becoming to the divine world of true beauty and intelligence (i 6.6). The 
wise man (σpiουδαῖος)49 ascends to the life of Intellect by the force of his godlike 
spirit (δαίµων) (iii 4.3). Each soul is an “intelligible universe” (iii 4.3) and our 
“allotted guardian spirit” is not ‘allotted’ by an external necessity or chance but is to 
be interpreted in terms of our own moral and intelligible principles according to 
                                                        
47
 See Kalligas 2009, 372-373; see also Enneads iii 5.9.24-29 and vi 7.35.33-34. 
48
 For Plotinus’ notion of virtue see Enneads i 2 On Virtues and i 4 On Well-Being. See also Ennead i 3 
On Dialectic. For Plotinus’ virtue ethics see Plass 1982; Kalligas 1984 introductory notes on Ennead i 
2; Dillon 1996, Smith 1999, Remes 2006 and Stern-Gillet 2009. 
49
 For the σpiουδαῖος in Plotinus see Schniewind 2003. 
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which we have chosen to live (iii 4.4-6). The δαίµων of the σpiουδαῖος is a god who 
chooses to follow the life of virtue that raises the soul to the level of Intellect and 
purifies our lives (iii 4.5). The σpiουδαῖος is the true inner man, our higher intelligible 
self that possesses “the virtues which belong to the sphere of intellect and have their 
seat actually in the separate soul, separate and separable even while it is still here 
below” (i 1.10.7-10). The wise and noble soul aims to live the eternal life of Intellect, 
the life of the higher part of the soul purely contemplating the divine reality of Nous. 
The real virtue of the σpiουδαῖος is to be aware of the perfection, self-sufficiency and 
completeness of Intellect: to contemplate the intelligible world where the soul is truly 
purified (i 2.4).  
Virtue is to be attained not by having intellect but by being intellect in self-
thinking eudaimonia (i 4.4). The noble soul of the σpiουδαῖος returns to its higher 
intelligible self through self-contemplation in likeness of Intellect’s eudaimonia. 
Plotinus vividly states that we have to become what we are; i.e. to “sculpt the statue 
of ourselves” and to care for our soul in a continuous process of self-perfection 
through the purification of virtue 50  (i 6.9). The virtue of the wise that leads to 
eudaimonia is to exercise the higher activity of the soul’s intelligible self (i 2.6-7). 
The σpiουδαῖος focuses on the higher intelligible part of the soul identified with the 
world soul; i.e. the higher part of the soul that is neither affected by the suffering and 
misfortune of the animated bodies (i 4.5-8) nor influenced in any way by the life of 
the perceptible world (i 4.9).  
Transmigration and post-mortem events should not concern the σpiουδαῖος. As 
Plotinus clarifies in i 1.11-12 that world soul is sinless and not involved in 
transmigration:  
And how does the living thing include brute animals? If, as is said, there are sinful human 
souls in them, the separate part of the soul does not come to belong to the beasts but is there 
without being there for them; their consciousness includes the image of soul and the body: a 
beast is then a qualified body made, as we may say, by an image of soul. But if a human soul 
                                                        
50
 For self-perfection in Plotinus and its relation to dual selfhood see Stern-Gillet 2009. 
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has not entered the beast it becomes a living being of such and such a kind by an illumination 
from the world soul. [i 1.11.8-15; trans. Armstrong modified] 
As intelligible and divine logos, the world soul has no sins (i 1.11.8-15; 12.1-4) 
and, therefore, it cannot be judged or punished in Hades nor transmigrated by passing 
from body to body (ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ µετενσωµατοῦσθαι).  
But if the soul is sinless, how is it judged? This line of thought disagrees with all arguments 
which maintain that the soul sins and acts rightly and undergoes punishment, punishment in 
Hades, and that it transmigrates. [i 1.12.1-4; trans. Armstrong modified]  
As Plotinus further explains in Ennead ii 9, punishment in Hades is a part of 
Plato’s eschatology that the Gnostics51 plagiarize and misinterpret: “for the judgments 
too, and the rivers in Hades and the reincarnations come from Plato” (ii 9.6.12-14).52 
It is only the lower part of the soul – an image of the soul – that transmigrates. The 
world soul or the higher part of the soul remains sinless and unaffected by bodily 
sufferings and concerns. Plotinus illustrates his position with the mythical figure of 
Heracles who is both a shade in Hades and among the gods: “Heracles had this active 
virtue and in view of his noble character was deemed worthy to be called a god – 
because he was an active and not a contemplative person (in which case he would be 
altogether in that intelligible world), he is above, but there is also still a part of him 
below” (i 1.12.35-39). 
Thus transmigrations and the punishments in Hades should not be conceived 
as involving the soul’s higher intelligible part but they should be regarded as relevant 
only to the soul’s lower perceptible part that is related to the body. The higher part of 
the soul, the intelligible part on which the σpiουδαῖος constantly attends and 
contemplates, remains undescended and uninvolved in transmigration. The higher part 
of the soul is firmly rooted and established in the divine world of the Forms. The 
                                                        
51
 Plotinus refers mainly to Plato’s mythical narration of after-life in the Phaedo 111d ff. For Hades in 
Plotinus and Porphyry as an earthly body see Smith 1984, 278 ff. 
52
 Plotinus criticizes the immoral doctrines of the Gnostics at ii 9.15. The Gnostics exclude virtue from 
human life: they do not clarify what virtue is nor do they explain to us how the divine world will be 
attained without virtue (15.26-40). For Plotinus and the Gnostics see Puech 1960, 159-190; Wallis 
1995, 12-13 and Kalligas 1997, 327 ff. On ii 9.15 see Kalligas 1997, 376-378. 
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cathartic power of virtue enables the wise soul to recognize both itself and its divine 
origins as well as to guard itself against the blows of fortune (ii.9.18.26-30). The 
σpiουδαῖος follows the higher life of virtue; the life of the noble souls that belong to 
the intelligible realm of the Forms; a life in likeness to the perfect, self-sufficient and 
self-determined divine reality of Nous.   
  
4 
 
Concluding: Plotinus’ treatment of metenswm£twsij is consistent with his 
dual theory of the soul. In the Enneads transmigration concerns only the lower 
perceptible part of the soul that is attached to the corporeal bodies. The higher part 
remains aloft in the intelligible world. Since transmigration is related to the lower 
perceptible part of the soul, therefore transmigration becomes irrelevant to the higher 
intelligible part of the soul. After death the perceptible part of the soul either ceases to 
exist or is reabsorbed into the world soul. Plotinus praises the excellence of the wise 
soul that constantly contemplates through the life of virtue its higher intelligible self 
and transcends its lower perceptible self. Virtue frees and purifies the noble souls 
from the perceptible realm so that the wise soul becomes self-sufficient and self-
perfected without being concerned with any kind of transmigration. 
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